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Abstract 
Sexual assault is a pervasive problem in the U.S. military, especially against women. Bystander 
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particularly helpful in contexts with high rates of sexual violence. Bystander training encourages 
and enables people to intervene safely and stop sexual violence. In the current study, we drew 
from an ecological model to investigate intrapersonal, microsystem, and exosystem factors that 
predicted Service members’ assumption of personal responsibility to intervene in an alcohol-
involved sexual assault. Moreover, we examined how these predictors played a role in decisions 
about how to intervene: confronting the perpetrator, assisting the victim, or finding someone to 
help. We analyzed data from 24,610 active duty personnel collected by the Department of 
Defense. Several factors significantly related to Service members’ bystander intentions: gender, 
rank, morale, attitudes about sexual assault, training, and trust in the military sexual assault 
system predicted the likelihood and method of bystander intervention. These findings help 
identify how and why people intervene (or fail to intervene) when they witness situations that 
could develop into sexual violence. 
 






See Something, Do Something:  
Predicting Sexual Assault Bystander Intentions in the U.S. Military  
Sexual violence is a pervasive problem in the U.S. Armed Forces. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) estimates that approximately 20,000 sexual assaults occur every year (DoD, 
2014). This military sexual assault (MSA) yields negative consequences for both survivors (e.g., 
depression, PTSD; Kang, Dalager, Mahan, & Ishii, 2005; Surís & Lind, 2008) and their 
workgroups (e.g., impaired productivity; Harned, Ormerod, Palmieri, Collinsworth, & Reed, 
2002). In response, the DoD has developed a strategic plan for changing military culture around 
sexual violence, including bystander intervention (DoD, 2014). 
Bystander intervention is increasingly promoted as important for reducing sexual 
violence, especially in high-risk contexts with high rates of sexual violence (Banyard, Plante, & 
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crimes or emergency situations and have the opportunity to intervene. Bystander training 
encourages and enables people to safely interrupt sexual violence, challenge norms and 
comments that support sexual violence, and provide support for sexual assault survivors 
(Banyard et al., 2004; Coker et al., 2014). To refine training efforts, it is important that we 
understand how, when, and why people intervene (or fail to intervene) when they witness 
situations that could develop into sexual violence. This was our aim, focusing on bystander 
decisions among active duty members of the U.S. military. 
The current study makes several novel contributions. First, we draw from an ecological 
model (Banyard, 2011) to examine multifaceted predictors of bystander intervention in the 
military—the majority of research on this issue focuses on college contexts, but the military is 
another high-risk context that is crucial to consider. Additionally, we examine what predicts 
Service members’ likelihood to assume personal responsibility to stop a potential sexual assault 
and the way they choose to intervene. There is little research examining why bystanders may 
choose different strategies of intervention (e.g., addressing the perpetrator directly, finding help). 
Theoretical Background 
According to classic bystander theoretical frameworks (Banyard, 2011), there are five 
steps that individuals must go through in order to provide help in a problematic social situation: 
1) notice the event, 2) interpret the event as a problem, 3) assume personal responsibility for 
doing something, 4) decide how to intervene, 5) act. These steps apply to a wide range of 
situations, including sexual assault (Berkowitz, 2009; Burn, 2009). Building upon this model, 
research identifies a variety of ways that bystanders can intervene. Bystander actions can be 
direct or indirect, involve the victim(s), perpetrator(s), or other bystanders, and take place before, 
during, or after an assault (Berkowitz, 2009; Chabot, Tracy, Manning, & Poisson, 2009; 
McMahon, Hoffman, McMahon, Zucker, & Koenick, 2013). For example, bystanders could 
choose to directly confront the perpetrator, directly remove the victim, or indirectly help by 
finding someone else to intervene, like the victim’s friend or the police.   
 Banyard (2011) has developed an ecological model predicting bystander intervention in 
sexual assault situations. Integrating Latane and Darley’s (1970) model of helping with 
ecological models (Bronfenbrenner, 1977, 2005; Kelly, 2006), Banyard’s (2011) framework 
proposes that the following levels of analysis are important for understanding bystander 
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beliefs, cognitions). Second, microsystem factors include relationships and aspects of immediate 
groups (e.g., peer interactions, peer group structures). Third, exosystem factors are components 
of the community setting that may affect how people perceive and respond to sexual violence 
(e.g., availability and quality of education about sexual assault, trust in institutional responses to 
sexual assault). Finally, macrosystem factors are features of the overarching organization of a 
society (e.g., broader societal values, norms, and practices). Collectively, these factors influence 
bystanders’ willingness to intervene and decisions about how to intervene in sexual violence. To 
date, this model has been primarily examined within college contexts. An important next step is 
to determine whether and how it applies to other high-risk settings, such as the military.  
Bystander Intervention in the Military  
The military is a unique macrosystem in which to study bystander behavior. As an 
organization, the military values honor, valor, respect, cohesion, and loyalty (Schmid, 2010). 
When sexual assault occurs within this context, there are a number of competing messages. 
According to military values and training, Service members should rely unconditionally upon 
fellow troop members. However, being sexually assaulted during military service means that a 
Service member cannot trust her/his fellow troop members— ither to respect their bodily 
autonomy and dignity or, when applicable, to intervene before an assault takes place; for 
example, when Service members are sexually assaulted by other Service members (Harned et al., 
2002). Bystander training, rather than victim-focused education/prevention programs (e.g., how 
to avoid rape), aims to change the culture around MSA and make all community members aware 
of and responsible for stopping MSA. Given that context is more predictive of MSA than any 
individual factor (e.g., history of sexual assault, age; Firestone, Miller, & Harris, 2012; Sadler, 
Booth, Cook, & Doebbeling, 2003), this is a much needed prevention strategy for MSA.  
Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the importance of “education and training to promote a 
professional culture that imbues knowledge, awareness, communication, personal responsibility 
and the empowerment to act” (DoD, 2014, p. 1). Over the past ten years, the DoD has made 
efforts to increase bystander training and behavior (Potter & Stapleton, 2012). For instance, the 
creation of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) in 2005 coincided with 
the implementation of Sexual Assault Awareness Month (SAAM) campaigns. SAAM campaigns 
attempt to raise awareness of MSA and promote bystander intervention. For example, the 2009 
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duty of every Service member to “prevent sexual assault by taking an active role in looking out 
for the welfare of friends and co-workers” (Department of Defense, 2009). 
Given these efforts, it is important to know how Service members interpret and enact 
their roles as bystanders. A few prior research studies have taken up this aim. Potter and 
Moynihan (2011) found that Army personnel were significantly more likely to engage in 
bystander behaviors to prevent sexual assault after participating in a bystander training program 
(Bring in the Bystander) tailored to the Army context. Similarly, Foubert and Masin (2012) 
compared the effects of a bystander training program adapted for the military (The Men’s 
Program) with a typical Army sexual assault brief on male soldiers’ willingness to intervene in a 
sexual assault, and found that men in the bystander training program were significantly more 
willing to help after training. Potter and Stapleton (2012) examined the effects of an adapted 
social marketing campaign (Know Your Power) for an Army installation, and found that 
exposure to the images increased soldiers’ sense of personal responsibility to intervene during a 
sexual assault, and this effect was strongest for those who identified with the content of the 
posters. These studies illustrate that bystander training can be effective for military personnel. 
The current study builds and expands upon this work. 
We drew from Banyard’s (2011) ecological model of bystander behavior to investigate 
intrapersonal, microsystem, and exosystem factors that predict Service members’ assumption of 
personal responsibility to intervene in an alcohol-involved MSA situation (Research Question 1).
Moreover, we examined how these predictors shape employees’ decisions about how specifically 
to intervene in this situation: confronting the perpetrator, assisting the victim, or finding someone 
to help (Research Question 2). Although bystander intentions are not the same as bystander 
actions, prior research demonstrates that intentions to intervene as a bystander predict actual 
bystander behaviors (Banyard, 2008; Banyard & Moynihan, 2011; McMahon et al., 2015). The 
following sections detail the predictors of bystander intervention examined in the current study. 
Intrapersonal Factors 
Most research on bystander intervention occurs at the person level, examining factors 
within individuals (e.g., social identities, attitudes, emotions) that affect bystander behavior 
(McMahon, 2015). Two of these factors—gender and beliefs about sexual assault—may be 















PREDICTING SEXUAL ASSAULT BYSTANDER INTENTIONS 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
6 
Gender. Previous studies have identified gender as an important variable for 
understanding MSA bystander behavior. Men are less likely than women to intervene as 
bystanders in instances of MSA (e.g., Banyard, 2008; Banyard & Moynihan, 2011; Burn, 2009). 
However, when they do intervene, men may be more likely to interrupt perpetrators, whereas 
women may be more likely to assist victims directly (Burn, 2009; Chabot et al., 2009). 
Compared to men, Service women endure far more MSA (Surís & Lind, 2008). Women also 
endorse fewer myths about rape and sexual assault (Banyard, Moynihan, & Plante, 2007). We 
therefore expect that women will be more likely than men to perceive MSA as a salient risk, 
notice events related to sexual violence risk, and take steps to intervene.  
 Beliefs about sexual assault. Attitudes and beliefs are important antecedents of 
bystander actions. A bystander must first appraise a situation as risky or problematic before 
deciding whether or not to intervene. Awareness of sexual assault as problem predicts likelihood 
of bystander behavior. Conversely, problematic attitudes related to sexual assault (e.g., women 
exaggerate rape allegations) relate to negative bystander attitudes and lower likelihood of active 
bystander behavior (Banyard, 2008; 2011). Over the past ten years, the U.S. military has made 
more concerted efforts to increase awareness of sexual violence as a problem that affects all 
military members. Service members who have internalized these messages (e.g., sexual assault is 
a problem) may be more likely to assume personal responsibility and engage as a bystander.   
Microsystem Factors 
According to ecological models, several layers of context surround and guide individual 
action. The most immediate layer of context is the microsystem, which includes social roles, 
interpersonal relationships, peer influence, and aspects of the immediate physical environment 
(Banyard, 2011; Bronfenbrenner, 2005). The context where assault takes place is increasingly 
considered a crucial element to bystander behavior (McMahon, 2015). We consider how two 
elements of the microsystem—member rank and unit morale—relate to bystander intentions. 
 Rank. Social standing may be an important factor contributing to bystander intervention 
(McMahon, 2015). Rank is an important indicator of the military microsystem, reflecting Service 
members’ roles, peer group, interpersonal context, and power within a rigid hierarchical 
structure. Previous research with college student populations finds that these microsystem factors 
predict bystander behavior. For instance, other individuals within one’s peer group can influence 
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challenges (or promotes) one’s status in a group (Banyard et al., 2004). Lower power—or more 
precarious status—is negatively associated with active bystander behavior. Given greater social 
and organizational power, higher-ranking personnel have greater ability (and sometimes 
obligation) to interrupt sexual assault, compared to those at lower ranks. We predict that that will 
translate into greater intentions to intervene among officers compared to enlisted personnel. 
 Unit morale. Morale within a unit may facilitate bystander behavior. Key components of 
morale include group cohesiveness, confidence that fellow Service members and unit leaders 
will protect oneself, and reciprocity to protect and serve in kind (Manning, 1994). We know from 
prior research college groups (e.g., sports teams) that a close bond among members is one of the 
strongest predictors of willingness to intervene in sexual assault situations (Banyard, 2008; 
McMahon, 2015; McMahon & Farmer, 2009). Group cohesiveness has also been linked to more 
direct and active bystander behavior (Rutkowski, Gruder, & Romer, 1983). We therefore expect 
higher morale to predict greater and more direct bystander intentions.  
Exosystem Factors 
Although extensive research on sexual violence and bystander intervention has examined 
the influence of individual and microsystem factors, less is known about the exosystem. The 
exosystem refers to events and features within one’s community—aspects of the immediate 
setting that profoundly surround and influence the embedded individuals (Banyard, 2011; 
Bronfenbrenner, 2005). We focus here on two exosystem-level factors related to MSA: sexual 
assault training exposure and trust in the military sexual assault system. 
Sexual assault training exposure. Education around sexual violence may help cultivate 
recognition and awareness, which are necessary preconditions to bystander intervention (e.g., 
Banyard, 2011). Indeed, college students who participate in sexual assault awareness training 
report greater active bystander behaviors (Banyard, 2008). Another study, which adapted a 
bystander intervention program for the military, found that the program increased participants’ 
confidence in acting as a bystander (Potter & Stapleton, 2012). In the military, SAPRO requires 
all Service members to undergo regular MSA training (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2013). 
However, recent research using the military’s own data suggest that delivery, dosage, and 
content of these trainings may not be consistent across Service members and branches (Holland, 
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may reflect this variability. We expect that exposure to more comprehensive sexual assault 
education will be associated with a greater likelihood to engage in bystander behavior.   
 Trust in the military sexual assault system. Although less research has been conducted 
at the exosystem level, some research suggests that a greater sense of trust in the community can 
promote helping behavior (Banyard, 2011). Trust is an important facet of the military context: 
women and men serve on active duty with the expectation that they can rely upon fellow Service 
members, leaders, and institutional systems to protect them from harm. The theory of 
institutional betrayal identifies the loss of trust and commitment that can occur among 
community members when an institution fails to prevent and respond appropriately to sexual 
violence (Smith & Freyd, 2014). For instance, trust in the military sexual assault system reflects 
employees’ confidence in the military’s ability to ensure victims’ privacy, dignity, and safety 
after an assault. If Service members do not trust the institution to respond to these behaviors, 
they may be less likely to place themselves in the (potentially dangerous) position to step in as a 
bystander—if the institution does not care, why should they? We put this possibility to an 
empirical test, examining how trust in the military system relates to bystander intentions.  
Study Summary 
The current study revolves around two primary research questions: (1) What predicts 
assumption of responsibility for sexual violence bystander intervention? (2) What predicts 
specific bystander intervention approaches (i.e., confronting the perpetrator, assisting the victim, 
or finding someone to help)? We consider predictors across multiple layers of the military 
ecosystem: intrapersonal (gender, personal beliefs about military sexual assault), microsystem 
(rank, morale), and exosystem (MSA training exposure, trust in the system). We hypothesize that 
the following will predict greater assumption of responsibility to intervene: identification as a 
woman, belief that sexual assault is a problem, officer rank, high unit morale, high training 
exposure, and greater trust in the military sexual assault system. Research Question 2 takes us 
into uncharted territory, with little prior work examining specific bystander actions that could 
inform directional hypotheses; we therefore opted to leave that question exploratory.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
We analyzed data collected by the DoD: the 2010 Workplace and Gender Relations 
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numbers of individuals across gender, race/ethnicity, and Service branch. Approximately 90,391 
active duty members received the survey (either online or on paper), and 26,505 (29.32%) 
provided usable data (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010). For details on these procedures, 
see Defense Manpower Data Center (2010) and Rock, Lipari, Cook, and Hale (2011). 
We analyzed data from Junior Enlisted personnel (E1-E4, n = 8,351, 33.9%), Senior 
Enlisted members (E5-E9, n = 8,937; 36.3%), Junior Officers (O1-O3, n = 3,981; 16.2%), and 
Senior Officers (O4-O6, n = 3,341; 13.6%) for a sample size of n = 24,610.1  This sample 
included 57.4% men and 42.6% women. There was representation of all Service branches: 
28.3% Air Force, 22.3% Army, 20.8% Navy, 19.6% Marine Corps, and 9% Coast Guard.   
Measures 
Bystander intentions. In their surveys, participants read a short scenario that could 
potentially develop into an alcohol-involved sexual assault: 
Suppose you see a female Service member, who you do not know very well, getting drunk 
at a party. Someone tells you that a guy from your work group is going to lead her off to 
have sex. What are you most likely to do in this kind of situation? 
Following the scenario, participants could mark one (and only one) of the following 
possible response: 1) Do nothing, 2) Leave to avoid any kind of trouble, 3) Find someone who 
knows the woman and can help her, 4) Talk to the woman/try to get her out of the situation, 5) 
Stop the guy from leaving with the woman, and 6) Other action. We collapsed options one 
(Nothing) and two (Leave), given that both responses reflect inaction. Additionally, we excluded 
the sixth option (Other action), due to ambiguity. Thus, we examined four possible responses to 
this scenario: 1) Do nothing (Nothing or Leave), 2) Get Help (Find someone who knows the 
woman and can help her), 3) Help the Victim (Talk to the woman/try to get her out of the 
situation), and 4) Stop the Perpetrator (Stop the guy from leaving with the woman). 
 Gender. Participants could identify as either Male (coded 0) or Female (coded 1). When 
this item was left blank, analysts at the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) imputed 
participants’ gender from their personal records. 
                                                        
1 Rank groups were created by DoD WGRA administrators, and they follow norms established in 
the literature (e.g., Schaller et al., 2014). We excluded data from n = 1,895 Warrant Officers, 
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Beliefs about sexual assault in the military. Service members were asked, “In your 
opinion, has sexual assault in the military become more or less of a problem over the last 4 
years?” The response options for this item included, 1 = Less of a problem today, 2 = About the 
same as 4 years ago, and 3 = More of a problem today.  
Rank. DMDC administrators used personnel records to determine participants’ rank (E1-
E4, E5-E9, O1-O3, or O4-O6). We created three dummy codes, with Junior Enlisted as the 
reference group (i.e., Senior Enlisted = 1 and Junior Enlisted = 0; Junior Officer = 1 and Junior 
Enlisted = 0; Senior Officer = 1 and Junior Enlisted = 0). 
Unit morale. Two items were used to assess morale. Participants were asked “Overall, 
how would you rate…the current level of morale in your unit?” and “…Your current level of 
morale” on a five point scale from 1 = Very low to 5 = Very high (r = .70).  
Sexual assault training exposure. Service members who indicated that they had 
received sexual assault training in the last twelve months (n = 21,846) rated their training on ten 
different content areas. Example content areas include “Provides a good understanding of what 
actions are considered sexual assault,” “Explains the reporting options available if a sexual 
assault occurs,” and “Teaches how to intervene when you witness a situation involving a fellow 
Service member (bystander intervention).” The stem for these items read, “My Service’s sexual 
assault training…” and response options ranged from 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly 
agree. We averaged these items to yield a single measure of training exposure (α = .98).  
Trust in the military sexual assault system. Three items measured participants’ trust in 
the military sexual assault system. The stem read, “If you are sexually assaulted, you can trust 
the military system to…,” and the three items were: “protect your privacy,” “ensure your safety 
following the incident,” and “treat you with dignity and respect.” The response options were 
True, False, or Don’t know. We followed the procedures created by Smith, Kendall, and Hulin 
(1969) to analyze and score the “Don’t know” response. First, the response options were coded 1 
= False, 2 = Don’t know, and 3 = True. Second, we summed all three items to yield a total score. 
Next, we created two groups with a mean split: Low Trust and High Trust. Finally, we ran a 
series of chi-square tests to determine whether the “Don’t know” responses were more likely to 
fall into the Low Trust group or High Trust group. Participants who responded “Don’t know” 
were overwhelmingly classified in the Low Trust group (e.g., for “ensure your safety”, 97.7% of 
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option should receive a more negative weighting. Thus, following Smith and colleagues (1969) 
scoring procedure, we coded False = 0, Don’t know = 1, True = 3. These items were then 
summed to give a total trust score from 0-9 (α = .87).  
Results 
Descriptive Results 
In response to the scenario, 3.6% (n = 838) said they would do nothing or leave to avoid 
trouble, 27.5% (n = 6,425) would get someone who knows the victim to help her, 25.0% (n = 
5,847) would help the victim directly or remove her from the situation, and 35.9% (n = 8,389) 
would stop the perpetrator. The other respondents who answered this question indicated that they 
would take some “other action” (8%, n = 1,866).2 See Table 1 for a descriptive breakdown of the 
actions taken by gender and rank, and Table 2 for means, standard deviations, and correlations.  
RQ1: What factors predict assuming responsibility for intervention? 
We conducted a logistic regression analysis to determine factors that predict taking 
bystander action (coded as 1; this included getting help, helping/removing the victim, or stopping 
the perpetrator) versus doing nothing or leaving (coded as 0) in response to the sexual assault 
scenario. The independent variables entered in the model were gender (women = 1; men = 0), 
belief that sexual assault is a problem in the military (continuous), rank (three dummy codes: 
Senior Enlisted = 1 and Junior Enlisted = 0; Junior Officer = 1 and Junior Enlisted = 0; Senior 
Officer = 1 and Junior Enlisted = 0), unit morale (continuous), training exposure (continuous), 
and trust in the military sexual assault system (continuous).3 Due to our large sample size, we 
used a more stringent criterion (p ≤ .001) to determine statistical significance—a practice 
advocated by other researchers analyzing large DoD datasets (e.g., Langhout et al., 2005). 
Results appear in Table 3. 
The full model was significant, χ² (8, N = 12,672) = 322.31, p < .001, which indicates that 
the model was able to differentiate between those who assumed personal responsibility and those 
who did not. The model correctly classified 97% of the cases. The amount of variance explained 
                                                        
2
 These participants did not provide the exact action they would take, and as a result, they were 
not included in any of the subsequent analyses.   
3 As a follow-up analysis, we ran all models with interactions between gender and the other 
independent variables. However, none of the interactions (either entered into the models together 
as a set or alone) were significant at our p-value criterion. Which suggests that factors like 
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ranged from 2.5% (Cox and Snell R Square) to 11.6% (Nagelkerke R Square). Women were 
almost six times more likely to take action than men (Exp(B) = 5.98, p < .001). Compared to 
Junior Enlisted members, Senior Enlisted were almost twice as likely to act (Exp(B) = 1.85, p < 
.001), Junior Officers were over twice as likely (Exp(B) = 2.42, p < .001), and Senior Officers 
were over three times more likely (Exp(B) = 3.75, p < .001). Higher unit morale was also 
associated with greater likelihood to take action (Exp(B) = 1.30, p < .001). Additionally, as 
participants reported increased exposure to sexual assault training (Exp(B) = 1.58, p < .001) and 
greater trust in the military sexual assault system (Exp(B) = 1.13, p < .001), they were more 
likely to assume responsibility and take action. Using our more stringent p-value criterion, belief 
that sexual assault is a problem in the military was unrelated to bystander action. 
RQ2: What factors predict specific bystander intervention approach? 
We ran three logistic regressions to determine the factors that predicted what actions 
Service members chose to take in response to the sexual assault scenario. Again, the independent 
variables entered in the model included gender, belief that sexual assault is a problem in the 
military, rank, unit morale, training exposure, and trust in the military sexual assault system. This 
analysis only included cases where respondents had indicated that they were “most likely to do” 
one of the three intervention responses: getting help, helping/removing the victim, or stopping 
the perpetrator (n = 20,661). All results appear in Table 4. 
Indirect action: Getting help. The first model predicted the choice of an indirect 
bystander strategy—find someone to help the victim (coded as 1) vs. another, more direct 
bystander strategy (either helping/removing the victim or stopping the perpetrator, coded as 0). 
The full model was significant, χ² (8, N = 12,336) = 483.86, p < .001, indicating that the model 
was able to differentiate between those who chose to get help and those who selected another 
action. The model correctly classified 70% of the cases. The amount of variance explained 
ranged from 3.8% (Cox and Snell R Square) to 5.4% (Nagelkerke R Square). Men were more 
likely to choose to find someone to help the victim (Exp(B) = 0.49, p < .001) than women. 
Additionally, beliefs that sexual assault is a problem in the military was a negative predictor of 
this intervention; in other words, Service members who thought sexual assault is less of a 
problem were more likely to find someone else to help the victim (Exp(B) = 0.87, p < .001) 
compared to direct intervention. Senior Enlisted members were no more or less likely to choose 
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1.35, p < .001) than Junior Enlisted personnel (and a similar trend was found for Senior 
Officers). Additionally, with every one unit decrease in exposure to sexual assault training and 
trust in the system, Service members were more likely to choose this indirect bystander strategy 
((Exp(B) = 0.81, p < .001 and (Exp(B) = 0.97, p < .001) respectively). In other words, those who 
had less training and trust were more likely to find someone else to help the victim rather than 
insert themselves into the situation directly.  
Direct action: Helping/removing the victim. Our second model predicted Service 
members’ decisions to help the victim directly (coded as 1) versus another intervention (either 
finding someone else to help the victim or stopping the perpetrator, coded as 0). The full model 
was significant, χ² (8, N = 12,336) = 1161.85, p < .001, which indicates that the model was able 
to differentiate between those chose to help the victim and those who selected another strategy. 
The model correctly classified 73% of the cases. The amount of variance explained ranged from 
9.0% (Cox and Snell R Square) to 13.1% (Nagelkerke R Square). Women, compared to men, 
were over four times more likely to choose to directly help the victim (Exp(B) = 4.12, p < .001). 
No other predictor had a significant impact on intention to intervene with the victim directly. 
Direct action: Stopping the perpetrator 
Our final model predicted Service members’ decisions to stop the perpetrator directly 
(coded as 1) vs. another bystander action (coded as 0). The full mode  was significant, χ² (8, N = 
12,336) = 346.20, p < .001, which indicates that the model was able to differentiate between 
those who chose to confront the perpetrator and those who chose another intervention approach. 
The model correctly classified 60% of the cases, which was lower than the other models. 
Additionally, the amount of variance explained ranged from 2.8% (Cox and Snell R Square) to 
3.7% (Nagelkerke R Square). Men, compared to women, were more likely to choose to confront 
the perpetrator (Exp(B) = 0.56, p < .001). Those who believed that sexual assault is a problem in 
the military were also significantly more likely to intervene directly with the perpetrator (Exp(B) 
= 1.11, p < .001). Additionally, greater exposure to sexual assault training (Exp(B) = 1.20, p < 
.001) predicted greater use of this direct strategy. Rank and unit morale were not significant 
predictors of this action, and trust in the system did not meet our more stringent p-value cutoff.  
Discussion 
Military sexual assault (MSA) is a serious and widespread problem, affecting thousands 
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adopted by the DoD to help prevent sexual assault is bystander education and intervention. 
Drawing on an ecological model, we sought to understand bystander decision-making among 
active duty military personnel. When asked how they would respond to an alcohol-involved 
sexual assault scenario, the majority stated that they would take some action. Approximately one 
quarter would help the female victim directly or get someone who knows the victim to help her, 
and just over one third would confront the male perpetrator. We investigated factors that predict 
these various intervention strategies. Simply put: who intervenes in military sexual assault, how 
do they intervene, and what promotes those intervention decisions? 
Intrapersonal Factors: Gender and Beliefs about Sexual Assault in the Military 
For our first level of analysis, we examined two intrapersonal factors: gender and beliefs 
about MSA. Mirroring prior research (e.g., Banyard, 2008, 2011; Burn, 2009), women compared 
to men were nearly six times more likely to state that they would take some bystander action in 
response to the sexual assault scenario. Women, compared to men, hold heightened awareness 
and fear of sexual violence (e.g., Brownmiller, 1975; Buchwald, Fletcher, & Roth, 1993). These 
fears are often well-founded, especially in the military: Service women are approximately twenty 
times more likely to be raped than Service men (National Defense Research Institute, 2014). 
Women are also less accepting of rape myths, such as “only bad girls get raped” (e.g., Burt, 
1980; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994). All of these factors could create a consciousness that 
enables women to notice and interpret sexual assault as a problem, which is a necessary 
prerequisite of bystander behavior (Bancroft, Long, & McCabe, 2011).  
In addition, women were four times more likely to indicate that they would help the 
victim directly. Men, on the other hand, were more likely to state that they would confront the 
perpetrator directly or find someone to help the victim. Other research finds that college men are 
more likely to engage in more risky and direct active bystander behavior (e.g., directly 
confronting the perpetrator; Chabot et al., 2009). One reason for this might be gendered social 
power, within society at large and the military. Women are the numerical minority: fewer than 
one in six Service members are women (although these figures vary by branch; for example, 
women comprise 20% of Air Force personnel yet just 6% of Marines; Department of Defense, 
2013). The military’s organizational culture also prizes masculinity over femininity (Zurbriggen, 
2010). Moreover, women are more likely to experience MSA and men are more likely to commit 















PREDICTING SEXUAL ASSAULT BYSTANDER INTENTIONS 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
15 
hesitant to directly confront the (usually male) perpetrator (Potter & Stapleton, 2012). Men, on 
the other hand, may have more social leeway to “call out” or confront another man.  
Gender differences in bystander intentions might also derive from the nature of bystander 
sexual assault training currently offered in the military. For instance, a video used in a DoD 
campaign called “Bystander Intervention—Bar Scene” depicts different roles for women and 
men. In this training video, women are portrayed as helping a (female) victim directly, by 
attempting to “get her away from here.” Men, on the other hand, are portrayed as confronting the 
(male) perpetrator, stating that they were going to stop him from doing “something stupid” 
(Department of Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, 2010). Training materials 
such as this tacitly suggest that women and men have different responsibilities when they witness 
a potential sexual assault in the making. Such implicit messages could have both benefits 
(promoting certain kinds of bystander actions) and harms (undermining other actions).  
Prior research suggests that women, compared to men, may be more likely to intervene in 
indirect ways (Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Sylaska & Walters, 2014). However, we found that men 
were more likely to state that they would take indirect action: by finding someone else who 
knows the woman to help her. Perhaps this finding arises from social expectations and norms 
within a male-dominated context. Fabiano, Perkins, Berkowitz, Linkenbach, and Stark (2003) 
found that men tended to underestimate the likelihood that male peers would serve as active 
bystanders and overestimate the likelihood that female peers would take action. Further, men 
were more likely to serve as active bystanders when they believed that other men would do the 
same. Thus, some men in our sample may have been hesitant to step in directly—whether that 
was to help the victim or confront the perpetrator.   
Global beliefs about military sexual assault predicted the specific nature of bystander 
intention. Service members who thought sexual assault is less of a problem in the military were 
more likely to indicate that they would find someone else to help the victim (indirect 
intervention). Conversely, Service members who thought military sexual assault was more 
problematic were more likely to state that they would stop the perpetrator directly. These 
findings echo prior research, which suggests that people endorsing dismissive attitudes about 
sexual assault are less likely to engage in active bystander behavior (e.g., Banyard, 2008). This 
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organization) seeks to motivate its members to intervene and interrupt sexual violence, it must 
educate those members on the gravity of that violence. 
Microsystem Factors: Rank and Unit Morale 
For our second level of analysis, we examined two elements of the microsystem: rank 
and unit morale. With respect to rank, as power increased, Service members were more likely to 
endorse bystander intervention: compared to Junior Enlisted members, Senior Enlisted were 
almost twice as likely to act (as opposed to “doing nothing”), and Junior and Senior Officers 
were over two and three times as likely to act, respectively. However, the specific behavioral 
strategies selected by some Officers were indirect and passive: Junior Officers were more likely 
to state that they would find someone to help the victim compared to Junior Enlisted members. 
There were also no significant differences between Enlisted personnel and Officers on either of 
the direct bystander actions (e.g., confronting the perpetrator). Prior research has emphasized the 
importance of leaders who model appropriate, effective, and active bystander behaviors (e.g., 
Banyard et al., 2004). When leaders serve as exemplary bystanders, others are more likely to 
serve as active bystanders in the future (Batson, 1998; Myers, 1999). Although Officers possess 
more institutional power, these results suggest that they are not more likely to use this power to 
intervene directly. Lower-ranking Service members are significantly more likely to suffer MSA 
(e.g., Harned et al., 2002; Surís & Lind, 2008); therefore, it is crucial that leaders are equipped to 
step in and respond effectively to sexual assault. Prior research finds that bystander intervention 
education programs are more effective when targeted toward high-status individuals (McMahon, 
2015). When leaders effectively promote a climate of safety and trust in their units, Service 
members may feel more comfortable taking on active bystanders roles. 
In addition to rank, unit morale also emerged as a significant microsystem predictor. 
Service members who reported high morale in their unit were more likely to state that they 
would intervene in a MSA. This finding mirrors research in college contexts—where cohesion 
among groups is associated with more willingness to intervene and engage in direct bystander 
action (McMahon & Farmer, 2009; Rutkowski et al., 1983). Our findings demonstrate that 
community morale is important to consider in military settings as well, suggesting that efforts to 
expand and improve active bystander training should consider not only military culture, but also 
cultures in individual units. Related research finds that unit norms can affect sexual violence; 
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more or less tolerant of sexual violence, especially when rigid organizational hierarchies are in 
place (Murdoch, Pryor, Polusny, Gackstetter, & Ripley, 2009). Again, military leaders may play 
a role in this, as they are generally responsible for the climate and welfare of their unit (DoD, 
2014). If unit leaders have successfully established a climate of safety, trust, dignity, and morale, 
then personnel may feel more comfortable coming forward with issues and incident reports.  
Exosystem Factors: Sexual Assault Training Exposure and Trust in the System 
For our third level of analysis, we examined two aspects of the exosystem: exposure to 
sexual assault training and trust in the military sexual assault system. First, we found that 
exposure to more comprehensive MSA awareness training was linked with a greater likelihood 
to intervene in any way, and greater likelihood to engage in a direct bystander strategy. 
Similarly, Service members with greater trust in the military system were more likely to state 
that they would take action in response to the sexual assault scenario; they were less likely to 
choose an indirect bystander strategy (finding someone to help). Our findings stress the 
importance of implementing high-quality military training for active bystander behavior. In 
particular, it might be most beneficial for training to cover a wide range of topics related to 
sexual assault—including specific actions bystanders can take—and educate Service members 
about specific sexual assault policies and practices. Additionally, the military must ensure that 
sexual assault response systems can be trusted (e.g., protecting victims’ privacy, treating victims 
with dignity and respect). These messages about the (un)acceptability of sexual assault may be 
critical for changing attitudes, norms, and actions around sexual assault in the military.  
Implications for Policy and Practice 
Stakeholders invested in sexual violence prevention have called for the development of 
evidence-based bystander education programs (e.g., Banyard & Moynihan, 2011). Consistent 
with ecological models, our results suggest that bystander interventions must be sensitive to the 
communities in which perpetrators, victims, and bystanders are embedded. We offer the 
following recommendations for improving sexual violence bystander education:  
 1) Do not reify gender stereotypes within training. The bystander intervention video 
described above demonstrates subtle ways that training materials may reinforce beliefs about 
who is a “victim” and who is a “perpetrator” of sexual violence, and the differing roles that 
women and men should play in stopping violence. It is important that education surrounding 
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aggressiveness and femaleness with subordination and submissiveness. Efforts to de-couple 
military culture from hegemonic and stereotypic ideas of masculinity and femininity may offer 
benefits to both women and men. Above and beyond the aim of reducing sexual assault, all 
Service members may benefit from the freedom to outwardly express care and compassion 
toward their comrades (Flood, 2011). Training efforts should not simply discuss sexual assault as 
a discrete event, but rather part and parcel of larger rape culture that pervades U.S. society. Some 
women and men may not feel safe intervening directly to stop MSA, fearing that they themselves 
will be victimized. Addressing this aspect of rape culture could expand the purview of bystander 
strategies (e.g., indirect methods) for those who do not feel safe confronting perpetrators directly. 
2. Incorporate socio-cultural information about sexual violence. Similarly, efforts to 
reduce sexual violence may be more successful if parallel efforts are made to address larger 
ideologies and social norms about sexual assault (e.g., Banyard et al., 2007; Banyard et al., 2004; 
Coker et al., 2014). Many Service members may be unaware of the true prevalence and 
consequences of MSA, and they may also endorse stereotypical yet inaccurate information about 
sexual violence. Attitude change related to sexual violence ideologies and rape myths can foster 
a bystander’s sense of responsibility and self-efficacy for intervening. Thus, enhanced education 
about sexual violence that includes information about social norms, rape myths, and cultural 
ideologies may help to encourage more direct bystander intervention.  
3. Involve leaders to (re)shape organizational culture. Leaders are crucial in 
preventing and responding to sexual violence, given their capacity to influence the ideologies 
and behaviors of their subordinates; this is especially in work cultures strongly rooted in 
hierarchy, such as the military. Military leaders are generally responsible for the climate and 
welfare of their units (DoD, 2014), so they must be actively engaged in order to adequately 
implement policies related to MSA. While it is encouraging that Senior Enlisted members and 
Officers were more likely to state they would take some action, we also found that Officers were 
more likely to take indirect bystander action. Further, other research shows some leaders to 
perpetuate aspects of rape culture through their use of gendered derogatory language and 
acceptance of jokes that glorify violence against women (Schmid, 2010). This is deeply 
problematic, because sexist, hostile environments are known to fuel sexual violence (e.g., 
Bostock & Daley, 2007; Firestone, Miller, & Harris, 2012; Harned et al., 2002). Similarly, 
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(Brown & Messman-Moore, 2010). These findings call for greater accountability and training of 
leaders, which could also enhance unit morale. Focusing on leaders may also improve military 
culture more generally, a necessary step in order to fully prevent MSA.  
 4. Conduct rigorous evaluations of sexual assault prevention/response trainings. 
Little prior research has evaluated military sexual assault education programs—including 
programs that aim to increase bystander behavior. Greater empirical evidence is needed in order 
to understand the content, effectiveness, and impact of these programs. We found that those who 
were exposed to less comprehensive training were less likely to intervene. This demonstrates the 
need for consistent, high-quality training for all Service members.  
It is important that efforts to design, implement, and evaluate bystander intervention 
trainings be evidence-based. The following best practices have emerged from prior research: 
administer more than one training session; use diverse pedagogical strategies; include 
information about different forms of sexual violence; teach specific intervention strategies that 
can be enacted before, during, and after an assault; avoid characterizing all women as victims 
and all men as perpetrators; and acknowledge that both men and women suffer sexual violence 
(e.g., Banyard et al., 2007; Banyard et al., 2004, 2005). We would advise that bystander training 
programs also be sensitive to ecology, or the social context in which actors are embedded. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Though based on a large and diverse sample, the current study has limitations. First, we 
conducted secondary data analysis of a survey administered at a single time point. There are 
more comprehensive measures of attitudes about sexual assault (e.g., rape myth acceptance) that 
would be important to examine, but we were limited by the measures included in the survey. 
Additionally, the cross-sectional nature of these data precludes assessments of change over time 
or conclusions about causal associations in the data. As suggested above, future research should 
implement rigorous evaluations of bystander intervention training, using a combination of 
experimental and longitudinal designs and analyses (e.g., randomized control trials). In addition, 
some of the effect sizes in the current study were relatively small; that said, even effects of small 
magnitude can be deeply meaningful (e.g., J. M. Cortina & Landis, 2011; Prentice & Miller, 
1992). Moreover, other effects were quite large, such as women being almost six times more 
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In addition, we examined bystander behavioral intentions in response to a single 
hypothetical scenario. The scenario included in the 2010 WGRA may be a common one; 
however, people may respond differently depending on the details of the scenario (e.g., if it 
involved a male victim, if the assault was already underway, if the victim and perpetrator were 
Enlisted members or Officers, if there was no alcohol involved). Additionally, participants were 
provided a list of ways to respond and instructed to choose just one, which may not fully 
represent the possible range of bystander interventions that Service members may take. 
Participants who chose to stop the perpetrator were not classified as well as the other 
interventions, which also suggests the importance of more in-depth examination of other 
bystander intervention techniques. Further research is needed to understand bystander actions in 
response to a wide variety of sexual assault situations—before, during, and after the assault.  
Finally, another limitation involves the lack of information about the bystander education 
programs delivered to Service members. Some research suggests that the effectiveness of 
bystander training can depend on factors such as content, length, and delivery setting (e.g., 
Alegría-Flores et al., 2015; Coker et al., 2011). One bystander intervention training was found to 
be less effective for men in a college primarily serving male students (Cares et al., 2015). This 
finding would be important to examine in the context of the military, an extremely male-
dominated setting. More research is needed to understand the content of military bystander 
training efforts and the effectiveness of these efforts—for example, in increasing bystander 
behavior, improving outcomes for MSA survivors, and decreasing the prevalence of MSA.  
Conclusion 
 Many Service members endure sexual aggression and assault during their military 
careers, carrying disastrous consequences to their wellbeing. Although the military has increased 
efforts to prevent and respond to MSA—including promotion of bystander intervention—less is 
known about the effectiveness of these efforts. Using an ecological model, we identified factors 
that shape bystander decision-making in sexual assault situations. More research is needed to 
understand how, when, and why people intervene (and fail to intervene) as active bystanders to 
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Actions Taken in Response to the Scenario by Gender and Rank 
 
Do nothing or leave Get help Help the victim  Stop the perpetrator 
 n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
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Men 684 (5.6%) 4,271 (35.1%) 1,879 (15.4%) 5,334 (43.8%) 
Junior Enlisted 442 (6.3%) 1,917 (27.3%) 2,098 (29.8%) 2,573 (36.6%) 
Senior Enlisted 255 (3.2%) 2,105 (26.8%) 2,100 (26.7%) 3,399 (43.2%) 
Junior Officer 95 (2.7%) 1,298 (36.3%) 942 (26.4%) 1,239 (34.7%) 
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Table 2 
      Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Continuous Variables 
Variables Mean (SD) Range 1 2 3 4 
1. Belief sexual assault is a problem 1.86 (0.74) 1-3 ― 
   2. Unit morale 3.24 (0.98) 1-5 -.15 ― 
  3. Training exposure 4.48 (0.65) 1-5 -.09 .21 ― 
 4. Trust in the system 7.21 (2.84) 0-9 -.16 .24 .37 ― 
Note. SD = standard deviation. All p's < .001 
 
Table 3 
Logistic Regression Predicting Assumption of Responsibility for Bystander Intervention 
Predictor β SE Wald χ²  df p Exp(B) 95% CI 
Gender 1.79 0.17 108.60 1 .001 5.98 [4.27, 8.37] 
Belief sexual assault is a problem 0.18 0.08 5.10 1 .024 1.20 [1.02, 1.40] 
Sr. Enlisted v Jr. Enlisted 0.62 0.17 14.05 1 .001 1.85 [1.34, 2.56] 
Jr. Officer v Jr. Enlisted 0.88 0.22 16.61 1 .001 2.42 [1.58, 3.69] 
Sr. Officer v Jr. Enlisted 1.32 0.23 33.94 1 .001 3.75 [2.40, 5.84] 
Unit morale 0.27 0.06 17.84 1 .001 1.30 [1.15, 1.47] 
Training exposure 0.46 0.08 30.58 1 .001 1.58 [1.34, 1.85] 
Trust in the system 0.12 0.02 39.09 1 .001 1.13 [1.09, 1.17] 
Note. CI = confidence interval. Men and Junior Enlisted are the reference category (coded as 0). 
 
Table 4 
Logistic Regression Predicting Specific Bystander Intervention Method 
Predicting Getting Help β SE Wald χ²  df p Exp(B) 95% CI 
Gender -0.72 0.04 262.46 1 .001 0.49 [0.45, 0.53] 
Belief sexual assault is a problem -0.13 0.03 23.15 1 .001 0.87 [0.83, 0.92] 
Sr. Enlisted v Jr. Enlisted -0.11 0.08 2.01 1 .156 0.90 [0.77, 1.04] 
Jr. Officer v Jr. Enlisted 0.30 0.09 11.84 1 .001 1.35 [1.14, 1.60] 
Sr. Officer v Jr. Enlisted 0.27 0.09 9.84 1 .002 1.31 [1.11, 1.55] 
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Training exposure -0.21 0.04 36.97 1 .001 0.81 [0.75, 0.87] 
Trust in the system -0.03 0.01 11.38 1 .001 0.97 [0.96, 0.99] 
Predicting Helping the Victim 
   
 
  Gender 1.42 0.04 1013.90 1 .001 4.12 [3.78, 4.50] 
Belief sexual assault is a problem 0.01 0.03 0.07 1 .789 1.01 [0.95, 1.07] 
Sr. Enlisted v Jr. Enlisted -0.04 0.08 0.30 1 .581 0.96 [0.82, 1.12] 
Jr. Officer v Jr. Enlisted -0.15 0.09 2.80 1 .094 0.86 [0.72, 1.03] 
Sr. Officer v Jr. Enlisted -0.14 0.09 2.47 1 .116 0.87 [0.73, 1.04] 
Unit morale 0.02 0.02 0.58 1 .447 1.02 [0.97, 1.07] 
Training exposure 0.01 0.04 0.04 1 .851 1.01 [0.93, 1.09] 
Trust in the system 0.01 0.01 0.02 1 .899 1.00 [0.99, 1.02] 
Predicting Stopping the Perpetrator 
   Gender -0.58 0.04 209.66 1 .001 0.56 [0.52, 0.61] 
Belief sexual assault is a problem 0.11 0.03 17.54 1 .001 1.11 [1.06, 1.17] 
Sr. Enlisted v Jr. Enlisted 0.13 0.07 3.31 1 .069 1.14 [0.99, 1.31] 
Jr. Officer v Jr. Enlisted -0.15 0.08 3.28 1 .070 0.86 [0.74, 1.01] 
Sr. Officer v Jr. Enlisted -0.13 0.08 2.81 1 .094 0.88 [0.75, 1.02] 
Unit morale 0.02 0.02 1.25 1 .264 1.02 [0.98, 1.07] 
Training exposure 0.19 0.03 30.47 1 .001 1.20 [1.13, 1.29] 
Trust in the system 0.02 0.01 8.58 1 .003 1.02 [1.01, 1.04] 
Note. CI = confidence interval. Men and Junior Enlisted are the reference category (coded as 0). 
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